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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over this appeal under 
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court on July 1, 2015. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW / STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Standard of Review: When reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, courts must accept as true all material 
allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). 
Whether such a motion was properly granted is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Id. (citation omitted). This standard applies to all issues on appeal.  
In the event the Court determines an issue was not preserved, the issue should be 
reviewed for plain error. Meadow Valley Contractors v. State, 2011 UT 35, ¶ 79, 266 P.3d 
671. That is, the Court must decide if an error exists, if the error should have been 
obvious, and if absent the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome. Id. (citation omitted). 
Issue 1: Did the district court err in considering the City’s affirmative defenses of 
voluntary payment and constitutional waiver where the Amended Complaint did not 
allege the necessary elements for these defenses? This issue was preserved in the district 
court. R. 306-10.  
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Sub-Issue 1: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs voluntarily paid 
for parking, parking fines and associated penalties where Plaintiffs alleged 
the City knew its ordinance was inadequate and induced payment through 
misinformation and unlawful threats of wide-ranging penalties? This issue 
was preserved in the district court. R. 85, 91-95, 144, 146, 151-56, 206-11, 
306-17.  
Sub-Issue 2: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs waived due 
process rights to challenge parking payments and tickets where Plaintiffs 
alleged the City: knew its ordinance was inadequate; misinformed Plaintiffs 
about the time, venue and grounds to lodge challenges; and did not provide 
the process, hearing officers or court review mandated by City Code? This 
issue was preserved in the district court. R. 91-95, 146-51, 206-11, 306-13. 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for 
unjust enrichment where Plaintiffs alleged the City enforced an admittedly outdated and 
inadequate ordinance, which carried mandatory language, and impacted the Plaintiffs’ 
property rights? This issue was preserved in the district court. R. 59-62, 100-04, 167-75, 
220-25, 337-49. 
Issue 3: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for 
inadequate notice due process under the Utah Constitution where Plaintiffs alleged the 
City’s Notice misstated the time, manner, venues, and legal grounds for lodging 
challenges? This issue was preserved in the district court. R. 51-53, 62-64, 145, 150, 155, 
594. 
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Issue 4: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for 
inadequate procedural due process under the Utah Constitution where Plaintiffs alleged 
the City ignored its own Code and invented procedures and grounds for challenging 
parking fees, fines and additional penalties that were contrary to City, state and 
constitutional law? This issue was preserved in the district court. R. 52, 54, 576 (26:10-
16), 594 (44:20-21). 
Issue 5: Did the district court err in finding Plaintiffs lacked public interest 
standing to seek collection costs, court costs, and attorneys’ fees on behalf of unnamed 
prospective class members where the rights of hundreds of thousands of Salt Lake City 
denizens and visitors are at stake, Plaintiffs are apparently the only ones prosecuting 
those rights, and the legal issues are common to all prospective class members regardless 
of the precise type of damages sustained by any individual? This issue was preserved in 
the district court. R. 104-05, 175-80, R. 225-30, 349-53. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint alleging claims for unjust enrichment 
and due process violations August 1, 2014. R. 36-68. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss 
and supporting memorandum and exhibits September 17, 2014. R. 78-119. Plaintiffs filed 
a Memorandum in Opposition to the City’s Motion to Dismiss October 14, 2014. R. 129-
87. The City filed a Reply October 31, 2014. R. 203-34.  
The district court held oral argument on the City’s Motion to Dismiss December 4, 
2014. R. 253; transcript at R. 551-634. After the oral argument hearing, the district court 
instructed the parties to submit proposed memorandum decisions (R. 611-14), which 
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Plaintiffs (R. 303-56) and the City (R. 468-506) submitted January 30, 2015. The district 
court granted the City’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice, first by memorandum decision 
February 27, 2015 (R. 507-16), then by final order July 20, 2015 (R. 544-50). Plaintiffs 
filed their Notice of Appeal March 27, 2015. R. 517-20.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between late 2011 and March 2012, the City replaced all of its 2,100 coin-
operated curbside parking meters with a system of 344 electronic parking pay stations, 
positioned approximately two stations per block face. R. 42, ¶ 35. The City admitted in 
an April 2012 proposed statutory overhaul of its code governing parking meters that 
“portions of the existing City Code contain provisions that refer specifically to the 
mechanical parking meters and are not conducive to the adequate use or regulation of the 
new parking pay stations . . . .” R. 47, ¶ 54. Yet the City continued for more than two 
years to enforce the outdated ordinance through a disinformation campaign, coercing 
payment through threats, and denying Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to challenge 
parking fees and fines by inventing its own administrative review procedures with no 
basis in law. R. 37-64. 
The City issued approximately 121,460 parking notices in fiscal year 2012-2013, 
and 143,813 parking notices in fiscal year 2013-2014. R. 43, ¶ 38. The City collected pay 
station/parking meter revenue in the amounts of $1,700,848 for fiscal year 2011-2012, 
$2,889,212 for fiscal year 2012-2013, and budgeted for $3,222,030 in revenue for fiscal 
year 2013-2014. R. 44, ¶ 39. The City has also sued people for purported parking meter 
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violations, and collected unknown sums in small claims court filing fees and attorney 
fees. R. 44, ¶ 42. 
The City issued eight “expired meter” notices to Plaintiff Timothy Bivens during 
relevant times, and Bivens paid $105 to the City in civil fines for these purported 
violations. R. 38, ¶¶ 7-9. The City issued 26 expired meter notices to Plaintiff Anthony 
Arias during relevant times, and Arias paid the City $510 in civil fines for these purported 
violations. The City issued one expired meter notice to Plaintiff Michelle Reed during 
relevant times, and Reed paid the City $55 in civil fines for this purported violation. R. 
40, ¶ 25; R. 41, ¶ 33. Each of the named Plaintiffs variously paid for parking at the City’s 
electronic pay stations during times relevant to this action. R. 38, ¶ 7; R. 39, ¶ 17; R. 40, 
¶ 24. After inquiring with Finance Department hearing officers to challenge citations, 
Bivens and Reed received copies of the Small Claims Court Information document. R. 
39, ¶ 11; R. 41, ¶ 31. Bivens attempted to challenge the validity of the enforcement 
ordinance in small claims court, but the court declined to reach the issue. R. 39, ¶13. 
Under the outdated parking meter system: an individual meter was installed 
immediately contiguous to each parking space; a user would insert coins into the meter 
adjacent to a particular space to pay for parking time; each meter would display the 
amount of time purchased, the amount of unexpired time remaining on the meter at any 
given time, and a visible sign indicating when the time on the meter had expired; and by 
adding coins to a particular meter, a user could purchase time in addition to any time 
remaining on the meter. R. 42, ¶ 36.  
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Plaintiffs alleged that under the subsequent electronic pay station system: the City 
replaced each parking meter with a numbered sign post adjacent to each pay-to-park 
space in the city; the sign posts do not accept payment, do not display time remaining for 
a space, and do not indicate when time for a space has expired; a user now must pay for 
the space remotely by using a cell phone, or the user must note the space number and 
travel to an electronic pay station to pay to park in the space; the electronic pay stations 
do not display time remaining for a space, and they do not indicate by visible sign when 
time for a space has expired; a user can pay by credit card or by depositing coins at a pay 
station; the user must input the parking space number on the pay station’s keypad; the 
user then must press the enter button on the keypad; the user must then insert a credit 
card or coins into the pay station; the user must then press the “add time” button on the 
keypad; the user must again press the enter button to confirm the purchase; the user 
should then receive a receipt for the purchase; and the user cannot purchase additional 
time prior to the expiration of the time purchased for a particular space and, by 
attempting to do so, any remaining time for the space automatically expires. R. 42-43 (¶ 
37). 
The statutory scheme governing paid on-street parking in Salt Lake City is found 
at City Code subsections 12.56.140 through 12.56.235. R. 45 (¶ 47). As early as June 
2010, when considering a switch from mechanical parking meters to electronic pay 
stations, the City Council was advised it needed to update the City Code’s definition of 
parking meters to include pay stations. R. 45 (¶ 48). In August 2011, the City Council 
was again advised it needed to update the Code to reflect the change to electronic pay 
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stations. R. 45 (¶ 49). In April 2012, the City Council received a draft ordinance—
approved by the City Attorney’s office—that would update City Code to reflect the 
systemic change from parking meters to pay stations. R. 45 (¶ 50). 
A “transmittal” to the City Council from the City’s Department of Community and 
Economic Development, dated April 13, 2012, urged the City Council to adopt the 
corrective ordinance “amending and updating Sections 12.56.140 through 12.56.235 and 
Section 12.96.010, of the Salt Lake City Code, pertaining to the use of parking meters and 
associated enforcement actions.” R. 46 (¶ 51). The transmittal stated:  
Over the past several months the City has been working with 
APARC Systems, Inc. to develop and install a new parking 
enforcement system built around parking pay stations rather than the 
older mechanical parking meters. The older parking meters were 
installed adjacent to each parking spot and only provided 
authorization to park in that particular parking spot. In contrast, the 
new parking pay stations are not installed adjacent to a particular 
parking spot and permit an individual to obtain authorization to park 
in any numbered parking spot within City boundaries. R. 46 (¶ 52). 
 
The transmittal continued:  
 
At this time, the transition from the more traditional parking meters 
to the new pay stations is either complete or almost complete. 
However, the parking ordinances found in the City Code contain a 
number of provisions that apply specifically to the old parking 
meters and do not accurately reflect the payment processes by which 
parking authorization is obtained using the new parking pay stations. 
The proposed ordinance amends the Code to more closely 
correspond to these new payment processes and to any pertinent 
enforcement procedures. R. 46 (¶ 53). 
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The preamble to the Corrective Ordinance stated in part: “WHEREAS, portions of 
the existing City Code contain provisions that refer specifically to the mechanical parking 
meters and are not conducive to the adequate use or regulation of the new parking 
pay stations . . . .” R. 46-47, ¶ 54 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs served the City a 
Complaint in this matter on June 20, 2014. R. 47, ¶ 55. In a transmittal dated July 1, 
2014, the administration again urged the City Council to pass the Corrective Ordinance 
(R. 47, ¶ 56), which it did on July 15, 2014 (R. 47, ¶ 59).  
The Parking Notice  
Parking notices issued by the City state on the front side that a civil penalty of $15 
is imposed if paid within 10 days, or $55 if paid after the tenth day. R. 51, ¶ 69. Parking 
notices state on the rear side that “[p]enalties increase as follows . . . 1 to 10 days—base 
fine; 11 to 20 days additional $40; 21 to 30 days additional $30; 31 to 40 days additional 
$40.” R. 51, ¶ 70. Parking notices state on the front side that “[v]ehicles with TWO or 
more Outstanding Parking Notices may be IMMOBILIZED or IMPOUNDED.” R. 51, ¶ 
71. 
Parking notices state on the rear side: “HEARINGS–To discuss your Parking 
Notice, you must see the Hearing Officer in person within 10 calendar days from the date 
of this notice at the Salt Lake City & County Building at 451 South State Street, Room 
145.” R. 51, ¶ 73. Parking notices do not state that those cited can request a hearing in 
writing through the justice court within 20 days. R. 52, ¶ 77; R. 63, ¶ 140. Parking notices 
do not state that additional penalties will be stayed upon filing a request for a hearing in 
justice court. R. 52, ¶ 78. Parking notices direct those cited to Finance Department 
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hearing officers rather than justice court hearing officers. R. 62, ¶ 134; R. 11, ¶ 44(d). 
When a person travels to “discuss” a notice with a hearing officer, and if the person is 
unable to resolve the notice and wishes to contest it, the City provides the person with a 
document entitled, and purporting to give, “Small Claims Court Information.” R. 52, ¶ 
79. Rather than provide the person cited with a hearing in justice court, the City then sues 
the person in small claims court. Id. 
The Small Claims Court Information Document  
The Small Claims Court Information document states: 
a. Parties in small claims actions are encouraged to represent themselves, but 
the City will be represented by a city prosecutor and a parking collections 
officer. 
b. The judge will only hear evidence regarding your parking/civil notice and 
related violation.  
c. If your complaint is regarding a problem with the way an area is marked, 
whether or not you feel the ordinance is valid and should be changed or 
how you were treated by the issuing officer, the courtroom is not the proper 
place for those types of complaints and will not be addressed by the judge.  
d. If the judge grants a judgment on behalf of the City, a court imposed filing 
fee will be added to the court case, depending on the principal balance.  
e. The judge may also impose attorney fees up to $175.  
f. A judgment will appear on your credit report and will affect your credit 
rating for 8 years. 
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g. Either party may appeal a small claims judgment within 10 days after the 
Notice of Entry of Judgment is received by the losing party.  
h. A Notice of Appeal must be filed with the court and the appropriate fee 
paid. 
R. 52-53, ¶¶ 80-90. 
Finance Department Hearing Officers 
Sometime between 2011 and 2013, the City moved its parking notice hearing 
officers from the justice court to the Finance Department. R. 54, ¶ 91. The justice court 
and the Finance Department are separate entities under the City’s governmental structure. 
R. 54, ¶ 93. The justice court has no authority over the Finance Department or its 
employees. R. 54, ¶ 94. 
Plaintiffs Causes of Action 
Plaintiffs ultimately alleged that by its plain terms, the City lacked lawful authority 
to enforce the outdated ordinance—particularly subsections 12.56.150(A)-(C) and 
12.56.190(A) and (B)—inasmuch as none of the prerequisites for a violation existed after 
the City replaced mechanical meters with electronic pay stations. See R. 59-62, ¶¶ 121-32 
(the prior and current ordinances are incorporated by reference and included in the 
Appendix). Thus Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to equitable refunds of all parking 
payments and penalties collected by the City. See id.  
Plaintiffs also alleged that the City issued them citations, and obtained their money 
in violation of the Utah Constitution’s due process protections. See R. 62-64, ¶¶ 133-148. 
Plaintiffs alleged the notices issued by the City misled them about the procedures to 
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contest a citation, the City did not actually provide the procedures mandated by City 
Code, and the City did not provide Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See 
Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state claims for unjust enrichment and denial 
of due process. Defendant enforced a parking meter use and regulation ordinance that it 
knew was illegal and unenforceable for more than two years. Defendant protected this 
illicit venture by inventing a whimsical process for challenging parking tickets which was 
so onerous, punitive and arbitrary, it all but guaranteed no person would challenge its 
validity, or the validity of the underlying ordinance. Plaintiffs bring this action to test 
whether a government can be held accountable to the same rule of law it wields as a 
truncheon against the governed.    
First, the City’s affirmative defenses of voluntary payment and waiver are 
inappropriate grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), where Plaintiffs did 
not allege the necessary elements to satisfy the defenses. Furthermore, these affirmative 
defenses fail as a matter of law where Plaintiffs alleged the City obtained their money 
through material misrepresentations about and misapplication of the enforcement 
ordinance and the Plaintiffs’ due process rights, coerced payment through illegal threats, 
and provided arbitrary and futile hearing and review procedures. 
Second, the City obtained the Plaintiffs money without authority of law and, by 
definition, it was thereby unjustly enriched. The plain language of the parking meter 
ordinance was unambiguous, expressly mandatory, implicated the Plaintiffs’ substantial 
12 
 
rights, and therefore required strict compliance for any one of these reasons. By the plain 
terms of the ordinance, Plaintiffs were not obliged to pay for parking or parking meter 
violations after the City replaced parking meters with electronic parking pay stations. 
Furthermore, the City’s procedures for challenging a citation were arbitrary and 
capricious, depriving it of legal authority under the Utah Municipal Code. At that, the 
City should be estopped from arguing the outdated ordinance was adequate to the use and 
regulation of parking pay stations, when it admitted precisely the opposite in a proposed 
corrective ordinance two years earlier. 
Third and fourth, the City deprived Plaintiffs of due process under any test. Its 
notice misinformed Plaintiffs about the time, place, manner, and arguments available to 
challenge citations. The City also provided unauthorized hearing officers who lacked 
jurisdiction under its own Code to hear challenges to civil citations, and it did not provide 
justice court hearings, as also required by its Code and state law. Such is the essence of 
arbitrary and capricious action. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs enjoy public interest standing to pursue refunds of certain 
collection costs, court costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by similarly situated class 
members despite Plaintiffs not having incurred those particular penalties themselves. The 
City’s conduct directly impacts the general public, Plaintiffs are best suited to make the 
claims, and the underlying legal issues are identical among Plaintiffs and the unnamed 
prospective class members. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WAIVER AND VOLUNTARY PAYMENT ARE (A) IMPROPER GROUNDS 
FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS, (B), PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT ENGAGE 
FUTILE PROCESSES, AND (C) THE DEFENSES FAIL ON THE MERITS. 
 
A. Waiver and Voluntary Payment are Affirmative Defenses and Improper for a 
Motion to Dismiss Where Plaintiffs did not Allege all Necessary Elements. 
 
Waiver and voluntary payment are affirmative defenses. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c)(2). A complaint need not anticipate affirmative defenses to survive a motion to 
dismiss unless it sets forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense. See 
Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Center, 2005 UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891 
(citations omitted).1  
For waiver, the City must prove there was “an existing right, benefit or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.” Soter’s v. Deseret Federal 
Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). To satisfy waiver, the Amended Complaint 
must show on its face Plaintiffs were each aware of at least the following due process 
rights: to challenge payments made for parking at the City’s electronic pay stations;2 to 
request a hearing within 20 days of receiving a parking notice;3 to a hearing with a justice 
                                                 
1 See also Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 947, 950-51 (Utah 2002) 
(affirmative defenses inappropriate for rule 12(b)(6) motion unless “allegations of the 
complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim”) 
(emphasis in original). 
2 Neither party alleges any such process exists under City Code, thus the first element—
“an existing right, benefit or advantage”—is not met as to payments for parking. 
3 City Code subsection 2.75.030(B) provides 20 days to request a hearing to challenge a 
ticket in justice court, whereas the City’s parking notices notify recipients that to 
challenge a ticket, they “must” see a hearing officer within 10 days. R. 51, ¶ 73. 
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court hearing officer;4 to a hearing in justice court;5 and to challenge the validity of the 
ordinance.6  
To the contrary, the Amended Complaint alleges the City misinformed Plaintiffs 
about, or denied them each of these rights, among others.7 As alleged, the due process 
rights the Plaintiffs now invoke either did not exist due to the City’s misapplication of 
City Code, or they were unknown to the Plaintiffs due to the City’s misinformation. Thus, 
the City cannot show the Amended Complaint alleged the necessary elements of waiver, 
and the Motion to Dismiss for waiver must be denied on this ground alone. 
To establish voluntary payment, the Amended Complaint must allege Plaintiffs 
paid for parking, parking tickets, and associated costs “with full knowledge of all of the 
facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion in some form.” Southern Title Guar. Co. v. 
Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and 
                                                 
4 City Code subsections 2.75.020(A)-(B) provide that hearing officers “shall serve as staff 
for the justice court but shall be supervised as an employee, under the direction of the 
city justice court director,” and their decisions will be governed by “the policies and 
procedures promulgated by the justice court,” whereas the City provides hearing 
officers employed and supervised by the Finance Department. R. 54, ¶ 91. 
5 Salt Lake City Code subsections 2.75.030(B), (C) and (E) make clear that upon request 
within 20 days, ticket recipients are entitled to a “hearing before the justice court,” 
and only if no hearing was requested, may the City seek “to collect such penalties, 
including late charges, administrative and court costs and attorney fees.”  
6 The City’s Small Claims Information document affirmatively misinforms ticket 
recipients who attempt to challenge a citation that “the courtroom is not the proper 
place” to challenge “whether or not you feel the ordinance is valid and should be 
changed.” R. 52, ¶ 82. 
7 See R. 37 (“Preliminary Statement”); R. 47, ¶¶ 57-59); R. 51-52 ¶¶ 73, 75-78, 82; R. 54, 
¶¶ 91-92; R. 62-64 ¶¶ 134-148. 
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Implied Contracts § 93 (1973)). The gravamen of the Amended Complaint is that the 
“City conducted a disinformation campaign to coerce payment of illegal parking fees and 
fines, and to deny Plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge the validity of the inapplicable 
ordinances, as was their right.” R. 37, ¶ 2.  
Far from alleging Plaintiffs paid voluntarily, Plaintiffs allege the City coerced 
payment through threats of rapidly increasing fines, negative credit reports, vehicle 
seizures and lawsuits. Plaintiffs allege the City ignored or misapplied City Code 
governing challenges and misinformed Plaintiffs about their rights to this end. The City 
also informed Plaintiffs their vehicles were observed in violation of an ordinance the 
Plaintiffs allege the City knew to be unenforceable. The misinformation was printed on 
the citations, and in the Small Claims Information document.8 Accordingly, the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint do not state a voluntary payment defense; in fact, 
the allegations negate this defense. 
B. Plaintiffs are Excused for Foregoing Futile Hearing and Appeals Procedures 
Administered by Hearing Officers who Lack Authority and Jurisdiction. 
 
“[I]t is well established that the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain 
act.”9 Ordinarily, parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies prior to seeking 
                                                 
8 At oral argument, the City admitted the citations issued to Plaintiffs misstated the 
process for challenging a citation (R. 573, p. 23:10-20), and the Small Claims 
Information erroneously stated the court was not the proper place to challenge the 
validity of ordinances (R. 576-577, pp. 26-27). 
9 Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Billings, J., dissenting); see 
also Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
and Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App 243, ¶ 15, 139 P.3d 271. 
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judicial review. See Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ¶ 11, 44 P.3d 724. However, 
exhaustion is not required where it would serve no purpose or is futile, or an 
administrative agency or officer has acted outside the scope of its defined, statutory 
authority. See Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 31, ¶ 11, 184 P.3d 599. 
Additionally, “the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not require one to initiate and 
participate in proceedings where an administrative agency clearly lacks jurisdiction.” See 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).  
Here the City contends Plaintiffs waived their procedural rights and voluntarily 
paid by failing to take advantage of the City’s codified opportunities to challenge a ticket. 
But it would have been futile for Plaintiffs to raise their claim that the underlying parking 
meter ordinance was inapplicable and unenforceable vis-a-vis parking pay stations. First, 
the City’s hearing officers had no such discretion;10 second, the City informed Plaintiffs 
the small claims court would consider no such argument. On this ground alone, Plaintiffs 
were not required to engage the City’s hearing process. 
Moreover, the City’s Finance Department hearing officers acted without statutory 
authority and thus lacked jurisdiction to hear parking notice challenges at all. Chapter 
2.75 of City Code, which governs enforcement of civil violations, states that hearing 
officers “shall serve as staff for the justice court,” and civil citations “shall be handled by 
the justice court.” City Code §§ 2.75.020(B), 2.75.030 (A).  
                                                 
10 See City Code §§ 12.56.570(E)(1)-(8) (enumerating bases for dismissing parking 
notices). 
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The City argues a later enactment governs as the most recent expression of 
legislative intent and thereby relieves the City of these requirements. R. 219-20. 
However, these subsections are silent about where and, under what authority, hearing 
officers shall serve. See City Code §§ 12.56.550-12.56.570. There being no statutory 
conflict, the issue is governed exclusively by the specific subsections 2.75.020(B) and 
2.75.030(A). 11 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not required to engage Finance Department hearing 
officers who lacked statutory authority and jurisdiction to hear parking ticket challenges. 
By the same token, Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust the City’s so-called 
appeal process. The City affirmatively misinforms ticket recipients that their remedy is to 
be sued in small claims court rather than to request and obtain a hearing in justice court,12 
and the City doesn’t provide justice court hearings.13 Thus, it would have been futile for 
                                                 
11 See Hall v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958 (“[W]hen two 
statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in 
application governs over the more general provision.”) (citation omitted). 
12 See City Code §§ 2.75.030(A) and (B), which provide that after a citation is issued, 
“the matter shall be handled by the justice court,” and to challenge a citation, the 
recipient must “file a written request for a hearing before the justice court.” If the 
citation is resolved with a hearing officer, “the hearing request shall be dismissed.” Id. 
at 2.75.030(C). The City does not provide this mandated procedure. Instead of seeking 
review as petitioner under the procedure provided by ordinance, the City flips that on 
its head, making the ticket recipient the defendant in a small claims lawsuit.  
13 In the City’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, it conceded 
small claims courts and justice courts are “jurisdictionally distinct.” R. 217, n. 13. 
Indeed, Utah Code gives justice courts jurisdiction over “violation of ordinances,” 
(Utah Code § 78A-7-106(1)) whereas the small claims court is a “limited jurisdiction 
division” of the justice court (Utah Code § 78A-8-101) with  
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Plaintiffs to request a hearing in justice court, and the small claims court exceeds its 
statutory authority and lacks jurisdiction to hear parking notice appeals.  
The City also affirmatively misinforms ticket recipients that the small claims court 
will not consider whether the underlying ordinance is valid.14 Again, where Plaintiffs’ 
underlying contention is that the ordinance was invalid, it would have been futile to 
pursue that challenge.15 
C. Constitutional Waiver & Voluntary Payment Fail as a Matter of Law. 
 
1. Constitutional waiver fails where Plaintiffs allege the City misinformed them 
about their procedural rights. 
The parties agree constitutional waiver occurs “when the totality of circumstances 
indicates an intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known constitutional right.” 
Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Furthermore, “courts 
indulge every presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” See 
                                                 
14 See also Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that requirement of tender to satisfy trover in a conversion claim is excused 
where obligee states he will not accept payment). Borrowing the same logic, Plaintiffs 
are excused for failing to challenge the ordinance’s validity when the City explicitly 
informs those seeking to appeal an unauthorized hearing officer’s decision that the 
review forum would not hear such challenges. 
15 Plaintiff Bivens received the Small Claims Information document containing this 
misinformation, as did Plaintiff Reed, through a representative. When Bivens 
attempted to challenge the validity of the ordinance in small claims court, his 
argument was not considered. Whether Plaintiffs actually received the misinformation 
or not, they would nonetheless be excused from engaging a process that does not 
permit their argument, and which does not provide the venue mandated by ordinance.  
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id. (citing Pitts v. Board of Educ., 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1989) (language quoted 
from Pitts). Waiver “is good only if it is done in an informed manner.” Pitts, 869 F.2d 
555, 557. Waiver of constitutional rights “must be knowing, intelligent acts done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).  
The City correctly points out that misinformation does not necessarily obviate 
waiver. However, courts consistently hold a waiver of due process rights does not occur 
when one, who is misinformed about available processes, forgoes those processes.16 
The City cites the seemingly similar case of Herrada v. City of Detroit, which held 
that, by paying, the plaintiff there waived the right to challenge a parking ticket based on 
a notice which exaggerated the penalties for failure to pay. See 275 F.3d 553, 559 (6th 
Cir. 2001). Significantly, however, Herrada distinguished between “false and misleading 
statements pertaining to the right to request a hearing or to appeal an adverse decision, as 
opposed to those relating to penalties for refusing to act . . . .” Id. Indeed, Herrada 
stressed that those misinformed about available hearings and appeals are entitled to more 
protection. See id. As the Federal Circuit summarized, “A decision made with blinders 
on, based on misinformation or lack of information, cannot be binding as a matter of 
                                                 
16 See Day v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding a notice that misled 
claimants by equating a new application with an appeal of the initial determination 
violated due process); Gonzales v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(concluding a notice of denial of disability benefits failed to provide adequate notice 
because it did not clearly indicate a determination becomes final if no request for 
reconsideration is made). 
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fundamental fairness and due process.” Covington v. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 750 
F.2d 937, 943-944 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations and internal quotes omitted) (reinstating 
appeal rights when termination notice misinformed retiree he had no right of 
reassignment).  
 The City’s reliance on Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1988) and 
Rector v. City & County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2003) is also misplaced. In 
Horn, the court held that parking notices did not mislead or misinform the plaintiffs about 
hearing rights. 860 F.2d at 705. Here, Plaintiffs allege and the City admits the notices 
misinformed recipients that to challenge a ticket, they “must” see a Finance Department 
hearing officer within 10 days, when City Code mandates requests directly to the justice 
court for resolution with a justice court hearing officer within 20 days.  
 In Rector, the court was faced with a single defect in a parking citation. Namely, a 
100-percent late fee would be charged for failure to pay within 20 days even if recipients 
timely challenged. See 348 F.3d at 940. Significantly, the holding in Rector, as in 
Herrada, considered misinformation about the penalty as opposed to the process. Rector 
ultimately held the plaintiffs lacked standing because, even if information about the 
penalty was misleading, the plaintiffs “lack[ed] any legal defense to the parking ticket.” 
Id. at 945. That is, “[u]nless a person asserts some basis for contesting a governmental 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, he is not injured by defective procedures he has no 
occasion to invoke.” Id. at 944.  
 Here, Plaintiffs base their underlying challenge on the outdated and admittedly 
unenforceable parking meter ordinance, and they complain the City misinformed them 
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about the processes available to challenge a citation as opposed to the penalty. Hence, 
Herrada, Horn and Rector are inapplicable. 
2. Voluntary payment fails where Plaintiffs alleged the City used illegal threats 
and misinformation to coerce payment. 
 
The City fails to establish Plaintiffs voluntarily paid for parking, parking citations, 
and related penalties. That is, Plaintiffs alleged facts necessary to establish they paid for 
parking and parking violations under duress, misinformation and fraud. 
Utah has recognized the voluntary payment doctrine for decades. “The rule is well 
settled that a person cannot recover back money which he has voluntarily paid with full 
knowledge of all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion in some form.” Southern 
Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 66 
Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 93 (1973)).  
The City’s Notice threatened Plaintiffs with lawsuits, vehicle seizures, escalating 
fines, collection and court costs, negative credit ratings and attorneys’ fees. Ordinarily, 
these warnings are permissible statements of the City’s authority to pursue lawful claims. 
However, given the City knew its underlying enforcement ordinance was inadequate, 
these were illegal threats that constituted duress. The Plaintiff’s also operated under 
mistaken information due to the City’s fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, thus 
their payments cannot be considered voluntary. 
a. Duress 
The Utah Supreme Court held a class of plaintiffs challenging assessments made 
under a water rights contract did not voluntarily pay amounts in excess of the contract, 
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because they were notified if they did not pay, they would not receive their water. 
Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1978). The Court found the 
threat constituted duress. Id. Other courts hold that threats to deprive people of 
“necessities” for nonpayment constitute duress. Examples include loss of a home, 
feminine hygiene products, telephone services, and utility services.17 
 Duress is also found where what is being threatened “would normally be a legal 
right . . . .”18 Even though civil litigation generally holds a privileged status exempting it 
from coercion, “[t]he threat or instigation of legal proceedings in pursuit of a claim 
known to be unjustified is wrongful prima facie; such acts constitute duress and a transfer 
induced thereby is voidable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 cmt. h. 
 Here, the citations stated repeatedly that the penalty would increase drastically 
every ten days—from $15, to $55, to $85, to $125—until paid. They warned that 
“[v]ehicles with TWO or more outstanding Parking Notices may be IMMOBILIZED or 
IMPOUNDED.” They warned that “[f]ailure to pay the penalty may result in the filing of 
a SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACTION and increased penalties.” They stated: 
“HEARINGS – To discuss your Parking Notice, you must see the Hearing Officer in 
                                                 
17 Randazzo v. Harris Bank Palatine, N.A., 262 F.3d 663, 669 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(internal citations omitted). 
18 City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., Inc., 809 N.W.2d 725, 744 (Neb. 
2011) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 14 cmt. g (2011)). 
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person within 10 calendar days . . . .” The Small Claims Information additional court 
costs, attorneys’ fees and negative credit ratings if a ticket is sustained. 
 Plaintiffs’ payments were made under duress because the City threatened lawsuits, 
seizure of vehicles, negative credit ratings and exorbitant penalties “in pursuit of a claim 
known to be unjustified.” That is, the City admitted in writing that the outdated ordinance 
was inadequate for the use and regulation of pay stations when it drafted a corrective 
ordinance in April 2012. Based on any of its unjustified threats, the City’s voluntary 
payment defense must fail. 
b. Mistake of Fact 
 Here, the Plaintiffs did not have full knowledge of all the facts. The City did not 
notify Plaintiffs of its view that the outdated parking ordinance was “not conducive to the 
adequate use or regulation of the new parking pay stations.”  
The City also deprived Plaintiffs’ of material information by misinforming them 
about their rights to challenge the citations. The City was required by City Code to 
provide justice court hearing officers19 but, without informing Plaintiffs, it provided 
Finance Department hearing officers. The City was required by City Code and state 
statute to provide justice court hearings,20 but it instead misinformed Plaintiffs that their 
                                                 
19 See City Code § 2.75.020(A), (B). 
20 See City Code § 2.75.030(A), (B): “When an enforcement officer determines that a 
civil violation of this code has occurred, the officer shall issue a civil citation, the 
matter shall be handled by the Justice Court . . . . Any person having received a 
civil citation shall, within (20) days, either pay the civil penalty as contained in the 
default penalty schedule or file a written request for a hearing in the Justice Court.” 
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recourse was to be sued in small claims court.21 The City also told Plaintiffs that to get a 
hearing they “must” contact a hearing officer in person within 10 days,22 whereas City 
Code permitted hearing requests in writing directly to the justice court within 20 days.23 
The City told Plaintiffs they could not challenge the validity of the ordinance.24 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs operated under a host of mistaken facts due to the City’s 
misinformation. On any of these grounds alone, the voluntary payment defense fails.  
c. Fraud 
Voluntary payment does not apply in cases of fraud, where “a plaintiff’s claim is 
predicated on a lack of full disclosure by defendant.”25  
Here, the City induced payment through fraud by misinforming Plaintiffs their 
vehicles had been observed in violation of an ordinance the City knew was inadequate to 
enforcement, about their rights to challenge a parking notice, and by wholly departing 
                                                                                                                                                             
(emphasis added); and Utah Code § 78A-7-106(1) (justice courts have jurisdiction 
over “violation of ordinances” within their territorial limits). 
21 See R. 52-53, ¶¶ 80-90; R. 62, ¶¶ 134-36. 
22 R. 51, ¶ 73; see also Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelop., 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 
(Utah 1979) (holding four notices published over 11 days did not meet substantial 
compliance with statute requiring published notice over four successive weeks). Here, 
the 10-day difference between the notice required and the notice provided constituted 
a 100-percent deviation which, by definition, is not substantially compliant. 
23 City Code § 2.75.030(B). 
24 R. 52, ¶ 82. 
25 Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 810 F. Supp. 2d 633, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Spagnola 
v. Chubb Corp., 574 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2009); Samuel v. Time Warner, Inc., 809 
N.Y.S.2d 408, 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)). 
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from the process provided by ordinance to challenge a parking ticket. On any of these 
grounds alone, the City’s voluntary payment defense must fail. 
II. PLAINTIFFS (A) STATED A CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHERE 
(B) THE CITY LACKED AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE OUTDATED 
ORDINANCE, (C) ITS INVENTED PROCESS WAS ILLEGAL, AND (D) THE 
CITY CANNOT ARGUE OTHERWISE. 
 
Plaintiffs stated a claim for unjust enrichment. First, Utah courts have recognized 
for more than a century that a city is unjustly enriched and must make restitution when it 
obtains citizens’ money without authority of law. Second, the City lacked authority of law 
to enforce the outdated parking meter ordinance after it replaced parking meters 
throughout the city with electronic parking pay stations. Third, the City lacked authority 
to issue and collect fines for parking violations under an administrative review and 
appeals process that was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. For the same reasons, the City 
deprived Plaintiffs of a legal remedy to challenge parking payments, fines and associated 
penalties. Fourth, the City should be estopped from arguing the outdated ordinance was 
adequate to govern the use and regulation of electronic pay stations when it admitted the 
precise opposite in writing in April 2012.  
A. A City is Unjustly Enriched when it Takes Money Without Authority of Law. 
 
The Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiffs and prospective class members 
“conferred a substantial benefit upon the City in the form of millions of dollars in parking 
payments, fine payments, collection fees and attorney’s fees.” R. 59, ¶ 121. It alleges the 
“City recognizes and acknowledges that benefit by committing substantial City resources 
to bolster its parking and enforcement revenues . . . [and] [p]arking and enforcement 
26 
 
revenue account for approximately three percent of the City’s total revenue.” R. 59, ¶¶ 
122-23. It then alleges the City “obtained the money of the class members without 
authority of law, and it is the City’s duty to refund the money under equitable principles 
of unjust enrichment, implied contract, and the City’s general obligation to do justice.” R. 
59, ¶ 124.  
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized for more than a century: 
If the city obtain the money of another by mistake, or without 
authority of law, it is her duty to refund it—not from any contract 
entered into by her on the subject, but from the general obligation to 
do justice which binds all people, whether natural or artificial. . . . In 
these cases she does not, in fact, make any promise on the subject, 
but the law, which always intends justice, implies one; and her 
liability thus arising is said to be a liability on an implied contract. 
 
El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779-80 (1977) (quoting 
Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23 Utah 103, 63 P. 907 (1901).  
Hence, there is no question a municipality enjoys a true windfall when it obtains 
money without authority of law. To illustrate: “Taxpayers who are compelled to pay an 
illegal levy are specially damaged by the increase of the burden they are forced to bear, 
giving them an interest distinct from that of the general public. That interest entitles them 
to equitable relief.” American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1992) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here too, Plaintiffs are entitled “against a 
governmental entity to recover public revenues involuntarily paid and unlawfully 
collected.” See id. at 760. 
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B. The Prior Parking Meter Ordinance was Unambiguously Unenforceable, 
Mandated Strict Compliance, and its Enforcement Prejudiced Plaintiffs. 
 
The thrust of the City’s argument is that its prior parking meter ordinance was 
adequate to the use and regulation of parking pay stations, because the City “substantially 
complied” with its terms. R. 223, ¶ 2. However, the City fails to meet several 
prerequisites before a court may consider substantial compliance. First, the terms of the 
prior ordinance are unambiguous and expressly mandatory, thus the City must strictly 
comply, and any resort to outside indicators of legislative intent are improper and 
unnecessary. Second, failure to enforce the ordinance in strict compliance with its terms 
worked prejudice against the Plaintiffs. 
The City argues its ordinances should be endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity. Indeed, “[t]he time honored rule of law is that the construction of statutes by 
governmental agencies charged with their administration should be given considerable 
weight . . . .” McPhie v. Industrial Com’n., 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). However, “if 
it is made clearly to appear that a statute has been misconstrued or misapplied it is the 
duty of the court to correct the same.” Id. 
Here, ironically, the City accurately construed the prior ordinance as “not 
conducive to the adequate use or regulation of the new parking pay stations.” It 
nonetheless enforced the outdated ordinance for years before passing the corrective 
ordinance, virtually verbatim, immediately after Plaintiffs pointed out the blunder. 
When interpreting an ordinance, courts “begin by first looking to the plain 
language of the ordinance.” M&S Cox Investments v. Provo City Corp., 2007 Utah App 
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315, ¶ 30, 169 P.3d 789 (citation omitted). “If the plain language of the ordinance is 
ambiguous, we may resort to other modes of construction.” Id. (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). “Intent is applied to carry out the purpose if it can be done in a manner 
which is consistent with the language of the statute.” Bd. Of Educ. Of Granite Sch. v. Salt 
Lake Cty., 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A 
statute is to be “construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not 
destroy another.” Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation 
and internal quote marks omitted). 
Generally, substantial compliance “is adequate when the provision is directory, 
meaning it goes merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business . . . and 
the policy behind the statute has still been realized.” Aaron v. Third District Court, 2007 
UT 24, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d 801 (citations and internal quotes omitted). “Strict compliance, on 
the other hand, is required when failure to adhere to the statute will affect a substantive 
right of one of the parties and possibly prejudice the party.” Id., ¶ 8 (citations and internal 
quotes omitted). Moreover, “[a]pplication of the substantial compliance doctrine where 
the ordinances at issue are explicitly mandatory contravenes the unmistakable intent of 
those ordinances.” Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 29, 979 P.2d 
332. That is, “[w]here from consideration of the whole statute and its nature or object it 
appears that the intent of the legislature was to impose a duty on a public officer rather 
than a discretionary power, even the word ‘may’ has been held to be mandatory.” Bd. Of 
Educ. Of Granite Sch., 659 P.2d at 1035. The term “shall” is a word with a “usually 
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accepted mandatory connotation,” and when it “has been used throughout the statutory 
provisions, the statutes in question must be interpreted strictly as they are plainly 
written.” Id. 
Here, the plain language is unambiguous in precisely defining the City’s 
obligations in relation to the obligations of people parking in regulated spaces in Salt 
Lake City, and in defining violations of those respective duties. At the outset, those duties 
arose with respect to a “parking meter,” defined by the prior Code as: 
any mechanical device installed within or upon the curb or sidewalk 
area immediately contiguous to a parking meter space which, 
when the mechanism thereof is set in motion, indicates unexpired 
parking time for the adjacent parked vehicle. 
 
Prior City Code § 12.56.140(A) (emphasis added). Electronic pay stations are not 
installed “immediately contiguous to a parking meter space”26 and they do not “indicate[] 
unexpired parking time for the adjacent parked vehicle.” They are positioned somewhere 
along a block face with no respect to individual spaces, and they do not indicate 
remaining time for any particular parked vehicle.  
                                                 
26 “Contiguous” is defined as “[t]ouching at a point or along a boundary; adjoining.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 362 (9th ed. 2009). Synonyms include “abutting, adjacent, 
adjoining, against, at close quarters, beside, bordering, bounding, close, confinis, 
conjoining, conjunct, connected, convergent, coupled, edging, end to end, in close 
proximity, in common boundaries with, in contact, joined, meeting, near, neighboring, 
next to, on the confines of, on the edge of, proximal, proximate, side by side, 
touching, verging.” Burton, William C., Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, “contiguous” (4th 
ed. 2007). 
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 Similarly, the prior ordinance defined a “parking meter space” as “[a]n area 
adjacent to a parking meter on any street.” City Code § 12.56.140(A). Electronic pay 
stations are located somewhere on each regulated parking block, but not “adjacent” to a 
particular space. Adjacent is synonymous with “contiguous,” and while it connotes 
objects that may not necessarily be touching, it “implies that they are united so closely 
that no other object comes between them.”27 
 The enforcement portion of the Code is also unambiguous, explicitly mandatory, 
and thus requires strict compliance. As a prerequisite to enforcement, the outdated 
ordinance mandated: 
the city transportation engineer shall cause to be installed contiguous 
to each designated parking meter space, on a parking meter so 
designated that the deposit of coins will set the mechanism of the 
meter in motion . . . so that the meter will show the unexpired 
parking time applicable to the parking meter space contiguous 
to the meter, and the meter, when such parking time has expired, 
shall so indicate by visible sign.  
 
Prior City Code § 12.56.150(A) (emphasis added).  
These “explicitly mandatory” provisions imposed a duty on the city transportation 
engineer to ensure these prerequisites were met prior to enforcement. No statutory 
prerequisite for a “parking meter” or a parking meter violation existed after the City 
installed electronic parking pay stations. Electronic pay stations are not installed 
“contiguous” to “each” designated “parking meter space,” do not “show the unexpired 
                                                 
27 See supra, n. 26; Burton, William C., Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, “adjacent” (4th ed. 
2007). 
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time applicable to the parking meter space contiguous to the meter,” and do not show by 
“visible sign” when such parking time has expired. At that, a meter is in violation only 
when “such sign is visible,” and this fundamental element is never met with pay stations.  
 The next subsection of the prior ordinance defined the public’s duties and 
obligations to pay for parking as follows: 
[n]o person shall park any vehicle in any parking meter space . . . 
without immediately depositing in the parking meter contiguous to 
the space such lawful coin or coins of the United States as are 
required for such meter and designated by directions on the meter, 
and when required by the direction on the meter, setting in operation 
the timing mechanism thereof in accordance with said directions. 
 
Prior City Code § 12.56.150(B). By the plain language, Plaintiffs had a duty to deposit 
coins in the meter contiguous to the space in which they parked. Electronic pay stations 
are not meters, are not installed contiguous to particular spaces, and they accept 
alternative forms of payment.  
 Even when a statute seems by its terms to be merely directory, substantial 
compliance is appropriate only when “no prejudice occurs as a result of failure to follow 
the direction of the statute.” Bd. Of Educ. Of Granite Sch., 659 P.2d, 1035 (citations 
omitted). The cases the City cites to this end make the Plaintiffs’ case. In Aaron v. Third 
District Court and Salt Lake City Corp. v. Haik, the courts held mere “technical” 
deficiencies did not prejudice the complaining parties there.28 Here, the City’s failures to 
                                                 
28 See Aaron, 2007 UT 24, ¶ 16 (lack of agency fax number in notice a “technical 
omission”); Haik, 2014 UT App 193, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 490 (citation to incorrect 
GRAMA provision in denying records request a mere “typographical error”). 
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comply required a wholesale statutory overhaul to remedy, and substantial-versus-strict 
compliance meant the difference between a duty to pay and adequate grounds to impose a 
civil penalty or not. 
A Louisiana appeals court rejected an almost identical argument where local 
residents sued New Orleans for failing to update parking ordinances when it replaced 
coin-operated mechanical meters with electronic pay stations. See Smith v. City of New 
Orleans ex rel. Shires, 71 So.3d 525 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011). There, the City argued a 
corrective ordinance passed months after installation of the new machines should apply 
retroactively. The Court disagreed, summarizing the City’s position as follows: 
The City maintains that retroactive application of the ordinance does 
not offend due process because residents have always been on notice 
that they would be fined if they did not place money in the 
traditional coin-operated meters . . . . Because the Parkeon stations 
did not provide for any new violations, it also allowed citizens to be 
fined if they did not park to pay [sic]. The City contends that the 
Parkeon stations merely updated the traditional coin meter to 
accommodate changes in technology in the method of payment; 
therefore, it should be applied retroactively.  
 
Id. at 530.  
The Smith Court rejected the position, finding “the installation and implementation 
of the [electronic pay] stations . . . changed the parking meter system throughout the 
City,” and “[c]itizens were entitled to notice that the [electronic pay] stations were being 
used to issue citations for parking violations, in lieu of the coin-operated meters.” Id. at 
531. Smith ruled the updated ordinance constituted a substantive change in the law—“an 
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ordinance that impose[d] new duties, obligations, or responsibilities upon parties”—
which could not be applied retroactively. Id. at 530-31. 29 
Here, as in Smith, Plaintiffs were entitled to notice of the substantive system-wide 
change from meters to pay stations. The prior ordinance specifically defined the legal 
obligations and bases for a violation by those parking in metered spaces with reference to 
coin-operated mechanical parking meters and, by definition, to the exclusion of electronic 
pay stations.  
Accordingly, the City lacked legal authority to collect parking meter payments and 
issue tickets after it removed parking meters from Salt Lake City. The provisions at issue 
are expressly mandatory and must be so inasmuch as they define the Plaintiffs’ 
substantive rights and obligations. Substantial compliance was clearly not the correct 
standard. The City nonetheless missed that mark by a long shot, as evidenced by the 
statutory overhaul required to bring pay stations within the meaning of the law.  
C. The City’s Administrative & Legal Review Process was Arbitrary, Capricious, 
Illegal, and Deprived Plaintiffs of a Legal Remedy. 
 
The City argues it has long enjoyed statutory authority to regulate parking by 
passing ordinances and enforcing them with fines and penalties, and it therefore acted 
under authority of law. The City, however, conflates its lawful authority with the lawful 
exercise of that authority, which the Plaintiffs here challenge. 
                                                 
29 See also Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm’n, 947 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah 1997) 
(“[a]ny amendment that creates, defines, or regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties works a substantive change . . . .[and] should not apply retroactively” 
(citations omitted). 
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Indeed, the City is authorized to “adopt an ordinance establishing an 
administrative proceeding to review and decide a violation of a civil municipal 
ordinance,” however, any such ordinance “shall provide due process for parties 
participating in the administrative proceeding.” See Utah Code §§ 10-3-703.7(1)-(2). 
Accordingly, the process cannot be “arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” See Hodgson v. 
Farmington City, 2014 UT App 188, ¶ 7, 334 P.3d 484. 
In West Valley City v. Roberts, this Court elucidated the principle, holding a failed 
attempt to record an administrative proceeding fell short of the city’s codified mandate 
that such proceedings be recorded. See 1999 UT App 358, ¶ 15, 993 P.2d 252. This Court 
explained that, although municipalities enjoy statutory authority to pass ordinances and 
enact administrative procedures, and “[w]hile strict rules of procedure need not apply in 
an administrative hearing, an administrative body may make procedural rules which it is 
then bound to follow.” Id. at ¶ 9. 
More pointedly, the Utah Supreme Court held the Utah Department of 
Transportation acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” when it “failed to follow its own 
rules” by permitting a district head to designate a hearing officer contrary to agency rules 
reserving such authority to the department’s director. R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Utah Dept. 
of Transp., 966 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1998). The Court explained: 
administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid 
and cannot be ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own 
purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action.  
 
35 
 
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). As this Court pointed out in Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, “[p]rocedural rules may appear . . . in statutes, ordinances, 
or even in an administrative body’s own rules,” and “[a]n administrative body is 
bound by such rules.” 818 P.2d 23, 28, n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
 Here, too, the City failed to follow its own rules regarding civil violations. As 
discussed in detail throughout Appellants’ Brief, it misinformed Plaintiffs about the 
process for challenging a citation. Particularly fatal to the City’s claim of lawful 
authority, it provided Finance Department hearing officers contrary to City Code 
subsection 2.75.020(B), which states the “hearing officer shall serve as staff for the 
justice court.” As the Utah Supreme Court noted in virtually identical circumstances in 
ROA General, Inc., “[s]uch is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action.” 
 For these reasons, the Plaintiffs also lacked a legal remedy inasmuch as the City 
deprived them of any.   
D. The City is Estopped from Arguing the Prior Parking Meter Ordinance was 
Adequate to the Use and Regulation of Electronic Pay Stations. 
 
The City admitted in its April 2012 draft overhaul of the parking meter ordinance 
that the existing ordinance was “not conducive to the adequate use or regulation of the 
new parking pay stations . . . .” R. 46-47, ¶ 54. If any doubt remained, the City 
extinguished it two years later when it ultimately passed the draft ordinance overhaul 
virtually verbatim. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and under the circumstances 
of this case, the City is estopped from now arguing the prior ordinance was adequate for 
the use and regulation of electronic parking pay stations. 
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To prove equitable estoppel, Plaintiffs must establish: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act.  
 
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993).  
 Plaintiffs alleged that the City, in writing, deemed the prior ordinance inadequate 
to the use and regulation of electronic pay stations. Nonetheless, the City continued to 
assert to Plaintiffs through parking violation notices that their vehicles were observed in 
violation of the knowingly inadequate ordinance, failed to pass the corrective ordinance, 
failed to stop enforcement and collections activities, and failed to inform the Plaintiffs the 
ordinance was inadequate. Based on these affirmative inconsistent statements and failures 
to act by the City, the Plaintiffs paid for parking and parking violations without challenge. 
It is hardly arguable Plaintiffs would have willingly paid for parking and parking 
violations had they known, as the City admitted in writing, that the ordinance was 
inadequate to the “use” and “regulation” of pay stations.   
  To be clear, the City admitted its prior ordinance was “useless,” “worthless,” 
“adverse,” “hindering,” “unconducive,” and “unhelpful” to the adequate use and 
regulation of pay stations when it drafted the corrective ordinance in April 2012.30 The 
                                                 
30 Roget’s 21st Century Thesaurus (3rd ed. 2010) provides these antonyms for the word 
“conducive.” 
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City cannot argue that the march of time ripened its “worthless” ordinance into an 
adequate vintage.  
III. PLAINTIFFS STATED A CLAIM THAT THE CITY’S MISLEADING AND 
INACCURATE NOTICE VIOLATED UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS. 
 
The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ notice due process claim and by 
failing to evaluate the City’s Notice under the Utah Constitution. Instead, the district 
court cited Utah case law only to the extent it reflects federal due process requirements.  
Plaintiffs’ due process claims were made solely under Utah Const. art. I, § 7.31 R. 
62-64. Utah courts have held the due process protections of the two constitutions are 
“substantially similar,” while distinguishing they do not proceed in “lockstep.”32 Even 
where the text of the constitutions is similar or identical, federal jurisprudence does not 
dictate the same meaning or scope of protection for the Utah Constitution,33 though Utah 
                                                 
31 The Amended Complaint does plead a claim under the United States Constitution. R. 
36-68. Utah courts evaluate procedural due process claims under its two-part test. 
First, “whether the complaining party has been deprived of a protected interest in 
property or liberty.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 
UT 84, ¶ 48, 299 P.3d 990 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 
(1999) (quotations and brackets omitted)). Then, “if the court finds [a] deprivation . . . 
, we consider whether the procedures at issue comply with due process.” Id. As 
deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ property (money and potentially their car) is undisputed, 
the issues are the City’s notice and procedure. 
32 See, e.g., Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 46, 250 P.3d 465. 
33 See, e.g., Jensen, at ¶46. (“While some of the language of our state and federal 
constitutions is substantially the same, similarity of language does not indicate that 
this court moves in ‘lockstep’ with the United States Supreme Court's [constitutional] 
analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the future that our state constitutional 
provisions afford more rights than the federal Constitution.”) (quotations omitted.)  
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courts consider United States Supreme Court caselaw to be “highly persuasive.”34 The 
parties cited to both Utah and federal cases in support of their positions, and agreed the 
Court should analyze notice due process under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)(though the City also suggested analysis under Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) was appropriate). R. 161, 218.35 
The City’s Notice violates both Utah and federal due process protections, and the 
district court’s errors under those analyses follow. 
A. Utah Constitutional Caselaw. 
 
1. The cumulative errors in the City’s Notice render it unfair, misleading and 
inadequate. 
Fairness is the heart of due process concerns in Utah. “At a minimum, ‘[t]imely 
and adequate notice … [is]at the very heart of procedural fairness.’” In re Worthen, 926 
P.2d 853, 876-77 (Utah 1996), quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
“[W]here notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the 
proceedings against him . . ., a party is deprived of due process.” Nelson, at 1212. “The 
demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.”  Worthen, at 877 
(quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). The Amended 
Complaint sufficiently alleges the City’s Notice is inadequate. 
                                                 
34 Untermyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942). 
35 Utah courts, when relying on federal caselaw, generally appear to follow McBride’s 
example, applying the Mullane test to evaluate notice sufficiency and applying the 
Mathews test to evaluate procedural due process.  
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The City’s Notice is rife with errors. The Notice shortened the time to respond 
from twenty days to ten. R.51, ¶¶ 73, 75. It changed the procedure to request a hearing 
from writing or calling the justice court to appearing in person before an unauthorized 
Finance Department hearing officer. Id. It changed the jurisdiction, venue, and rules from 
justice court to small claims. Id. It denied a full opportunity to present one’s contentions 
before a hearing officer or in small claims. R. 52, ¶82.36 It shortened the 30 days provided 
by statute for an appeal from small claims to only 10 days. U.C.A. § 78A-8-106(1); R. 
53, ¶¶ 87-88.  
The Amended Complaint plainly states and it is reasonable to infer, due to the 
number and nature of errors, that the City’s Notice sought to make the process unfair, 
from issuance of the citation onward. This is certainly not “just” to the Plaintiffs. The 
City’s deliberately misleading and unjust Notice violates the Utah Constitution under 
Worthen and Nelson. The district court’s error can be reversed on this basis alone. 
2. The City’s misleading Notice fails to provide adequate notice of the nature of 
the proceedings. 
 
Plaintiffs repeatedly alleged the Notice fails to adequately alert recipients of the 
venue prescribed by City Code and the procedural consequences of that venue. Plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
36 “If your complaint is regarding a problem with the way an area is marked, whether or 
not you feel the ordinance is valid and should be changed or how you were treated by 
the issuing officer, the courtroom is not the proper place for those types of complaints 
and will not be addressed by the judge.”  
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Amended Complaint, Opposition, and oral argument alleged parking ordinance violations 
must be decided in justice court.37 
The City agreed small claims and justice courts are “jurisdictionally distinct,” but 
argued without explanation that this does not affect due process. R. 217, n. 13. The 
district court’s decision did not address this distinction.38 
Utah has decided that “where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party 
of the nature of the proceedings against him . . . a party is deprived of due process." In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d at 878 (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212) (emphasis added)). 
Nelson specifically cited cases with consequences similar to this case: where 
notice did not convey the jurisdictional or procedural consequences of proceeding in the 
particular venue, notice was inadequate. See Nelson at 1213, (citing State v. Gibbs, 500 
P.2d 209, 215 (Idaho 1972)). Gibbs held an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and 
binding a juvenile over for trial as an adult violated the juvenile's due process rights, 
because the order resulted from inadequate notice. Id. The Gibbs notice contained only 
allegations of the juvenile's unlawful acts and set the date for “interviews” with the 
presiding magistrate. It did not convey that the “interviews” served to determine whether 
juvenile jurisdiction applied or should be waived. Id. Nelson held that a notice which fails 
                                                 
37 City Code § 2.75.030(B), (C) and (E); R. 51-52, ¶¶75, 77; R. 145,150, 155; and R. 594, 
44:9-13. 
38 See In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 36, 266 P.3d 702 ("Because subject 
matter jurisdiction goes to the court's authority to hear a case, courts have an 
independent obligation to ... raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties 
either overlook or elect not to press." (omission original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).” 
41 
 
to convey the potential consequences of a hearing does not satisfy due process, and that 
procedural and jurisdictional consequences can be determinative of notice due process. 
Gibbs’ misleading information about jurisdiction carried not only vastly different 
potential sentencing outcomes, but also vastly different procedures and protections. 
Here, the procedural consequences of the City’s choice of the small claims venue 
are significant and numerous. For example, justice court actions are governed by the 
U.R.C.P. or U.R.Cr.P. (and the U.R.E. in both instances). U.R.C.P. 1, 81(e); U.R.Cr.P. 1; 
U.R.E. 1101(a). Small claims courts do not strictly apply the rules of evidence and 
employ vastly simplified rules of procedure lacking any pretrial discovery. U.R.C.P. 
81(c); U.R.S.C.P. 1, 6, and 7(d).  
Moreover, the jurisdictional distinction of the two courts is set by statute. Justice 
courts have jurisdiction over “violation of ordinances” within their territorial limits. 
U.C.A. §78A-7-106(1). A small claims action, by contrast, is defined in relevant part as 
being “for the recovery of money where (i) the amount claimed does not exceed $10,000 
including attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and interest; and (ii) the defendant 
resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in 
which the action is to be maintained.” U.C.A. §78A-8-102(1)(a). Yet, no debt can be 
owed to the City until the “violation of ordinance” itself is first proved by the City.  
Under statute and ordinance, the place to prove violations of ordinance is justice court. 
By intentionally notifying Notice recipients that hearings would proceed in a 
different venue than required by ordinance and statute, the Notice failed to inform 
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recipients of the procedural and jurisdictional consequences of that venue. This violates 
Nelson’s holding and the district court erred in dismissing the notice claim. 
B. Federal Caselaw. 
The district court decided issues of notice due process under federal constitutional 
standards, which have neither been adopted under nor uniformly applied to the Utah 
Constitution. The district court applied factually and legally inapposite caselaw and failed 
to use or erred in applying the Mullane test (the preferred federal test of notice due 
process). The City’s Motion fails under federal tests, and the district court’s decision was 
error. 
1. The district court erred by only applying cases addressing notices that 
misled about fines and penalties, whereas greater protection is due when 
notices mislead about process. 
The district court explained its notice due process decision in two sentences. The 
first stated:  
on the issue of notice specifically, even assuming some 
misinformation or omissions as alleged here, numerous jurisdictions 
have held that this notice is constitutionally adequate. See e.g. Rector 
v. City & County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 948 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950)); see also Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, 
10, 100 PJd 1211 (citing the constitutional standard announced in 
Mullane to articulate Utah's notice requirements). 
 
R. 514. 
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The cases cited by the district court and the City—Rector, Herrada, Horn, and 
Gillespie— do not address misinformation even remotely resembling the Notice.39 Those 
cases only address notices that misled recipients about fines as opposed to process. 
Critically, the district court did not consider that Herrada expressly stated that 
information about process requires greater protection. 
The City admitted, for its Motion, its Notice was misleading as to 1) a 20-day 
deadline to request a hearing, rather than 10 days per the ticket (R. 573, 23:16-18); 2) that 
“any additional fees” are stayed once the hearing is requested (R. 573, 23:19-20);  and 3) 
one’s inability to raise certain challenges (R. 576, 26:10-16). The Notice also misled 
recipients about requesting a hearing in writing to the justice court rather than in person 
with a hearing officer, and entitlement to a justice court hearing rather than being sued in 
small claims. 
 In contrast, Rector only alleged misinformation about a late fee.40 Rector did not 
involve misinformation about timeframe, venue, process, or permissible arguments. 
Next, Herrada v. City of Detroit held Herrada’s payment of a citation waived his 
right to challenge a ticket that only exaggerated the penalties for failure to pay. See 275 
                                                 
39 The Court also cited Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, 1 10, 100 P.3d 
1211 (R. 514). However, Jackson only addresses sufficient service of process and 
does not discuss the adequate contents of a notice. Jackson is wholly inapposite here. 
40 In addition, most of Rector’s claims about the sufficiency of notice—including its 
primary due process claims—were dismissed for lack of standing due to an admitted 
lack of legal basis to contest the ticket. Id. at 945. Other claims in Rector were 
dismissed (§ 1983 claims) on other grounds, and Plaintiffs here do not allege any § 
1983 violations. 
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F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2001). However, the Herrada court pointedly distinguished 
between “false and misleading statements pertaining to the right to request a hearing or to 
appeal an adverse decision, as opposed to those relating to penalties for refusing to act . . 
. .” Id. Herrada stated that persons misinformed about the availability of hearings and 
appeals are entitled to more protection than those merely misinformed about the amount 
of potential penalties. See id.  
Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1988) is similarly irrelevant, 
deciding only that notices demanding payment for tickets after penalties were assessed 
did not violate due process because they were not misleading. Id. at 705.  Horn’s facts are 
exactly opposite to Plaintiffs’. 
The second sentence of the district court’s notice due process decision stated:  
any of the purported inaccuracies in the Small Claims Court 
Information do not rise to a due process violation as a matter of law. 
See, e.g. Gillespie v. City of Northampton, 950 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 
384-386 (holding that filing fees to challenge a parking ticket, in 
excess of the underlying ticket amount, does not constitute a due 
process violation). 
 
R. 514. 
 
The Gillespie case never mentions or analyzes the substance of its notice, which  
was never alleged to be misleading or otherwise substantively deficient. Moreover, those 
who challenged tickets were not limited in making “objections and any supporting 
evidentiary material,” id. at 381, and there were no jurisdictional issues. So, while the 
district court here was correct insofar as Gillespie held that imposing its fee to contest a 
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citation was not unconstitutional under Mathews, Gillespie is irrelevant to analyzing due 
process protection from misleading information about process. 
Last, the district court’s decision cited McBride v. Utah State Bar, which analyzed 
notice due process under Mullane. 2010 UT 60, ¶¶ 17-18. R. 513.41 The McBride Court 
found the Bar’s seven notices to McBride were not misleading and therefore adequately 
apprised him of potential penalties. As in the other cases cited by the City and the Court, 
McBride did not address a notice rife with misinformation about process, and is 
inapposite. 
Rector, Horn, Herrada, Gillespie, and McBride all address notices with errors 
bearing no resemblance to City’s Notice, and their holdings can shed no light on the 
allegations and issues presented here (which are necessarily fact-based under Mullane). 
Those notices did not misinform people about the time permitted to contest a citation; 
where and how to begin that process; what type of hearing is available; the rights of those 
involved and the rules governing any such hearing; who is authorized to conduct the 
hearing; or the arguments which could or could not be made. Plaintiffs alleged that the 
City’s Notice did that, and the City conceded such on several points. 
The district court erred in dismissing the due process notice claims under federal, 
Utah, and foreign state jurisprudence. 
 
                                                 
41 McBride applied Mathews when analyzing procedural and hearing due process. 
McBride at ¶¶ 20-29. 
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2. The City’s Notice violates the Mullane test, because one who actually desired 
to inform a party would not reasonable adopt the City’s Notice.  
The preferred federal test of notice due process claims is provided by Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.42 The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶53, 299 P.3d 990 cited Mullane’s 
requirement that a notice must “apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections, . . . reasonably [] convey the 
required information, and . . . afford a reasonable time . . . to make their appearance."  
Critically, Jordan River (via Mullane) also requires “the means of notice employed 
must be what one desirous of actually informing the [party cited] might reasonably 
adopt.” Id. (citing Mullane at 315). The City’s numerous and cumulative errors and 
omissions defied Mullane’s mandates: 
a. one “must” request a hearing in person within 10 days (improper notice of 
the pendency of the action and improper jurisdiction); 
b. the City assesses penalties on day 11, before the deadline to request a 
hearing (pendency); 
c. adjudication in small claims court rather than justice court (pendency and 
jurisdiction); 
                                                 
42 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Jordan River 2012 UT 84, ¶56 and fn. 9, (quoting Dusenbery 
v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) (the United States Supreme Court “has 
developed a framework for evaluating notice claims. . . .[and] held that Mullane, as 
opposed to the test articulated in Mathews. . ., is generally used to assess notice-based 
due process claims….”)). 
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d. bar on contesting the validity of the ordinance, issuing offices’ actions, or 
physical implementation not complying with ordinance (denying the 
opportunity to present one’s contentions); 
e. omitting the stay of penalties upon a hearing request (false expectation of 
further penalty for exercising the right to, and while waiting for, a hearing); 
f. threatening seizure of vehicle for more than one unpaid ticket, omitting 
seizure will not occur until tickets are 40 days overdue (false expectation of 
further penalty for exercising the right to, and while waiting for, a hearing); 
g. providing Finance Department hearing officers, while City Code requires 
justice court hearing officer employees supervised by the court; and 
h. legislating grounds for hearing officers to reduce or dismiss tickets by 
ordinance, while City Code vests that authority only in the justice court. 
The numerous errors in the Notice singly and cumulatively show the City was 
anything but “desirous” of “actually informing” the Plaintiffs of the law or the process 
due to them. If that is not made plain by the allegations, the City’s admissions of Notice 
errors, and the City’s failure to amend its ordinances as recommended by its counsel and 
staff in order to make the pay station system enforceable, it is certainly a reasonable 
inference from those allegations, which the district court was required to make in 
Plaintiff’s favor. 
Instead of using the Notice to provide factual information, the City wages a battle 
of disinformation to coerce payment of parking citations without challenge. Who would 
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wade through the monumental, incorrect efforts required by the Notice to save $15 (or 
$55)? Indeed, due to the Notice, almost no one has.43  
As Mullane observed, “Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless 
one. . .can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” 
Mullane, at 314. The City’s Notice and de facto procedures, veering so far from its own 
laws and state laws, denied Plaintiffs’ any real choice in whether to contest or simply pay 
up. Whatever else may be said of the Notice, no one who actually desired to inform it 
recipients of the correct requirements for challenging it would have adopted the City’s 
Notice. 
Plaintiffs’ rights under Mullane were rendered meaningless by the Notice, and the 
district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ notice claims under the Mullane test. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THE CITY’S 
PROCEDURES DO NOT VIOLATE THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
 
The district court’s decision did not address the City’s policy of precluding 
challenges to the system’s validity or implementation. Nonetheless, the district court 
erred by tacitly deciding this policy does not offend Utah due process protections. The 
district court also erred when applying the Mathews test. 
 
 
                                                 
43 A review of Court Xchange for such cases revealed only five by members of the 
proposed class during the relevant time period. R.166. 
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A. The City’s Hearing Process Violated Utah Procedural Due Process Protections 
By Precluding Specific Evidence, Objections, and Arguments. 
For seventy years, the Supreme Court has held that while adjudication may 
appropriately be an executive or administrative function, a bottom line binds all 
adjudicatory venues: 
. . .[A]ll these methods and means provided for the protection and 
enforcement of human rights have the same basic requirements — 
that no party can be affected by such action, until his legal rights 
have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body authorized 
by law to determine such rights, of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give 
evidence as to his rights or defenses. 
 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).44  
 “Typically, a hearing must provide parties the opportunity to present evidence, 
objections, and arguments, to. . . enable[ the court] to fairly and intelligently pass upon 
and determine the questions presented for decision.” Jordan River, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 111, 
quoting McGrew v. Indus. Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 616 (Utah 1938) (emphasis added). 
More specifically, “Due process includes an opportunity to present [one’s] evidence and 
[one’s] contentions. Ignoring a party’s legal contentions denies a party a fair opportunity 
to be heard and defend.” Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31-32 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quotations omitted, emphasis added) citing R.W. Jones Trucking v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n, 649 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1982) (additional citations omitted). 
                                                 
44 See also U.C.A. § 10-3-703.7 (“A municipality may adopt an ordinance establishing an 
administrative proceeding to review and decide a violation of a civil municipal 
ordinance. . . [which] shall provide due process for parties participating in the 
administrative proceeding.”). 
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The City’s process bars challenges to the validity of City ordinances and 
procedures, their implementation, and officers’ enforcement actions. R. 52, ¶82. The 
Justice Court finished the job by refusing to consider such arguments by Mr. Bivens. R. 
39, ¶ 13; R. 592, 42: 15-25. The City later admitted in Motion arguments that barring 
those legal and factual arguments was “error.” R. 576, 26:10-16. 45 
The Supreme Court’s review of due process in administrative hearings in Tolman 
underscored that while “administrative agencies may not be bound by formal rules of 
evidence and procedure, [that] does not mean that they are above the law.” 818 P.2d at 31. 
The same is true of hearing officers’ proceedings, small claims, and justice courts. 
“Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing . . . has a due process right to 
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Fairness requires not only an absence of 
actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness.” Bunnell v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted, emphasis 
added). 
As the City acted as executive, legislature, and judiciary for every aspect of 
Plaintiffs’ citations, the City must be held to these standards throughout. Any other result 
would be unfair and unlawful, per Bunnell and Tolman. As alleged in the Complaint, the 
                                                 
45 Moreover, the City’s “error” renders any hearing officer review or court trial an 
exercise in futility for challenging the validity of the system. The City may not 
compel persons cited to take a futile action. “It is well established that the law does 
not require litigants to do a futile or vain act.” Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 901 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Billings, J., dissenting); see also Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., 
Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); and Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT 
App 243, ¶15, 139 P.3d 271. 
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City (with the Justice Court’s assistance) succeeded in making hearing officer, small 
claims, and justice court proceedings fundamentally unfair by preventing challenges to 
the City’s system and its implementation. 
Christensen, Bunnell, and Tolman make clear the City’s system violates the Utah 
Constitution’s due process protections, because the City prevented people from 
presenting their evidence and contentions, and did not try to prevent the possibility of 
unfairness. The district court therefore erred. 
B. The City’s Arbitrary and Capricious Procedure Did Not Comport With City 
Ordinance and Violated Utah’s Due Process Protections.  
 
The City violated Utah procedural due process protections by failing to follow its 
own procedural rules. The district court erred by not binding the City to its ordinances 
and regulations. Utah courts require that once an agency sets procedural rules, it must 
comply with its rules. 
Administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid 
and cannot be ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own 
purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. 
Without compelling grounds for not following its rules, an agency 
must be held to them.  
 
State Dept. of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 
(Utah 1980).46 
                                                 
46 “Administrative agencies engage in a variety of functions. Certain administrative 
decisions are [policymaking ], . . . others resemble judicial decision . . .  [to 
determine] whether a party . . . has violated a regulation.” V1-Oil Co. v. Dept. of 
Environ. Quality, 939 P. 2d 1192, 1196 (Utah1997). 
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Similarly, in R.O.A. General, Inc., v. Utah Department of Transportation, the 
Supreme Court held “UDOT failed to follow its own rules regarding [a] hearing officer's 
appointment, and thus the agency's action is both ‘contrary to a rule of the agency’ and 
‘arbitrary and capricious.’” 966 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1998). The R.O.A. Court then 
summarized Community Affairs succinctly: “[A]dministrative regulations . . . cannot be 
ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of 
arbitrary and capricious action." Id. (citing Community Affairs, 614 P.2d at 1263).47 
Here, looking at governing City ordinances and state statutes, the process for 
contesting citations is unambiguously prescribed. The City must follow that process, as 
required by Community Affairs and R.O.A. Were the City not bound by statutes and its 
ordinances, and instead permitted to jettison the law at its convenience when 
implementing its parking and enforcement systems, “such is the essence of arbitrary 
action.” Due process may encompass many things, however, the Constitution forbids it 
from being arbitrary. The City’s and the district court’s interpretations rendered art. I sec 
7 a nullity.  
Utah courts have held to these decades-old requirements from Christensen (if not 
before) to the present day.48 Under Christiansen, the “person or body” reviewing the 
                                                 
47 The R.O.A. court vacated the arbitrary action and remanded for further proceedings. 
Id., at 843. It also decided a determinative issue of law necessary to the final 
determination of the case (proper construction of a statute) upon remand, citing 
U.R.A.P. 30. Id. The Court here should do the same for all issues necessary to decide 
the case in district court. 
48 A sampling of cases citing Christensen includes State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, 
¶27, 273 P.3d 417; Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, fn. 6 (Utah 
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dispute must be “authorized by law” to do so, and one must have the “opportunity to be 
heard and to give evidence as to his rights or defenses.” Id. Under Community Affairs, 
R.O.A., and Tolman, once an adjudicating entity sets its rules, it must follow those rules. 
The Amended Complaint alleges 49 that neither the hearing officers nor the small claims 
court are authorized by law to adjudicate parking violations and the City violated its own 
ordinances and rules for such adjudications, thus violating due process protections of the 
Utah Constitution under Community Affairs, R.O.A., and Tolman. 
The district court erred in permitting the City to do so.  
C. The City’s Hearing Process Fails to Satisfy the Mathews Test. 
The district court erred in deciding the City’s procedures met the Mathews test. 
Mathews requires that a court evaluate and balance three considerations: (i) the property 
interests affected by the governmental action; (ii) the risk of erroneous deprivation, given 
the procedural safeguards in place; and (iii) the government interests served by the 
procedures, including the fiscal and administrative costs of more process. Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 335 (1976).  
First, the district court deemed Plaintiffs’ property interests of “$15-$55” to be 
“relatively small.” R. 508; 513. Yet, as the Notice states, any person cited must forego far 
more significant property than $15 in order to challenge the validity of the City’s de facto 
system or its implementation. Such challenges could only be made in the third 
                                                                                                                                                             
1993); and Celebrity Club Incorporated v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982). 
49 The City also concedes for its Motion that the Notice correctly describes its process. R. 
217, fn. 12. 
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adjudication—upon appeal from small claims to district court—which requires a 
minimum of $485 to commence.50 According to the Notice, challengers would also run 
the risk of negative credit reports and vehicle seizures in the meantime. 
Under Mathews’ second prong, the district court stated (without analysis) only 
“given that the City provides a two-tiered process of review, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation is low.”51 R. 513. In reality, the City’s system maximizes the chances of 
erroneous deprivation.  
First, challenges are reviewed by hearing officers who are not employed or 
supervised by the justice court, but are instead Finance Department employees.52 R. 54, 
¶¶ 91-92. Second, hearing officers may or may not consider unstated elements of 
                                                 
50 A $15 fine + $60 small claims filing fee + $175 City attorney fee + $235 appeal filing 
fees = $485 (at minimum). U.C.A.§ §78A-2-301. This vastly exceeds the cost ratio 
($15 citation requiring $480 cost to present one’s contentions) that was rejected by a 
sister court as an “irrevocably bad bargain.” See Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, 
582 F.3d 617, 620-21 (6th Cir., 2009) (holding that Williams had standing to allege 
due process violations from a red-light camera ticket, despite not paying for or even 
requesting a hearing, because the cost to contest was so high). “[A] notice that offers 
the ticketed the choice between paying a $50 fine and having to pay $67.50 to 
challenge it offers no choice at all. . . . it [was] an irrevocably bad bargain. Imagine, 
for example, if the ticket was for $50 but the fee was $100,000—we would not say 
there that it was improper not to pay the fee to challenge the procedures.” Id. 
51 The City posited that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because both hearing 
officers and justice courts can dismiss citations, and that hearing officers were 
provided specific bases to dismiss certain, limited citations. R. 96. 
52 “As a necessary corollary to [the] opportunity [to be heard], affected parties must. . .be 
assured that their concerns will be heard by an impartial decision maker.” V-1 Oil Co. 
v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 939 P. 2d 1192, 1197 (Utah 1997), citing Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 325 n. 4. 
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disputed ordinances, consider unknown burdens of proof (or not), and do so without 
public knowledge or scrutiny. The hearing officer reviews provide no real process at all; 
they are a model of arbitrariness, barely fettered discretion, and self-serving theater 
designed to provide the illusions of fairness. Third, the City’s policies, Notice, and 
hearings actually seek to maximize collection of parking enforcement revenue rather than 
permitting fair challenges to citations. The City could adopt ten tiers of review, but if they 
preclude any challenge to the system’s validity and the fairness of their implementation, 
they encourage and shield erroneous deprivations by design. Fourth, the City’s choice to 
ignore ordinance and statute by adjudicating in small claims increases the likelihood of 
erroneous deprivation by eliminating any pretrial discovery, doing away with the Rules of 
Evidence, and the other procedural protections provided by the U.R.C.P. 
Under Mathews’ third prong, the district court decided the City’s interest in using 
its unauthorized system is “substantial,” because the City issues 100,000 citations or 
more per year, which “requires some mechanism for quick resolution without resorting to 
a full-fledged hearing.”53 R. 513-14. 
Yet, the City offered no argument that “more” or “fairer” process would increase 
its administrative or fiscal costs. In reality, the City can cure several of its constitutionally 
                                                 
53 The City pled poverty using the same language: only a “mechanism for quick 
resolution without resorting to a full-fledged hearing” can be due. R. 97.  
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deficient procedures at minimal expense by simply tearing up its current Notice and, 
instead, accurately citing its own laws. The cost of such changes would be minimal.54  
Similarly, the City can make plain the elements, burdens, and criteria which must 
control hearing officers’ decisions. This would simply replicate the fair processes and 
protections governing justice courts and administrative hearings without the expense of 
an actual hearing. This would also require minimal effort and cost, while yielding great 
improvements in transparency, trust, and fairness (in procedure and outcomes). 
In sum, the district court erred in assessing each of the three prongs of Mathews 
and its balancing of them. First, the Plaintiffs’ property interests affected by the City’s 
actions were vastly understated, as the property at stake required to assert one’s rights 
(costs to make challenges only available in district court) to protect one’s property (the 
fine plus penalties not abated before the filing deadline) must be considered. Second, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation under the few procedural safeguards actually in place is 
high, because the process is arbitrary, bears no resemblance to the process actually 
required by ordinance and statute, and prevents any challenge to the validity and 
implementation of the system itself until any third-level adjudication.  Third, the 
government interests served by its procedures, including the fiscal and administrative 
costs of more or different process, were vastly overstated. The City can change several of 
its procedures at minimal cost with significant gains in fairness of process and outcome. 
                                                 
54 Moreover, if the City was correct about the fairness of its process, doing so would 
cause little or no increase in the handful of yearly district court cases (i.e. expense or 
administration). 
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The district court erred in failing to take the allegations of the Amended Complaint as 
true when deciding that the factors balanced in favor of the existing regime. 
Finally, constitutional due process should not encompass a system designed to 
eliminate the use of the courts. Nonetheless, that has been the City’s goal and it has, for 
all practical purposes, achieved it. From the installation of pay stations in March 2012 
until its July 2014 “update” of its parking ordinances, over 250,000 parking citations 
were issued under City Code. R. 43, ¶38. Yet, no more than 20 ever reached district court, 
including only five from the proposed class.55 R. 166. The City has its cake and eats it, 
too. 
The City’s de facto enforcement process fails the Mathews test, and the district 
court erred in using that test as a basis to dismiss Plaintiffs’ notice due process claims. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANTS PUBLIC 
INTEREST STANDING TO SEEK REFUNDS OF COLLECTION COSTS, 
COURT COSTS, AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES. 
 
Public interest standing to seek refunds of collection costs, court costs, and 
attorneys’ fees is appropriate because the City’s actions and process directly impact the 
public and will not be resolved by other branches of government or the political process. 
The district court’s public interest standing analysis was in error. 
The district court first erred by deciding Plaintiffs are not an “appropriate” party 
“because they have no personal interest in these specific damages.” R. 510-11, citing 
Packer v. Utah Attorney General’s Office, 2013 UT App 194, ¶17, 307 P.3d 704.  
                                                 
55 Based on a review of Court Xchange for such cases filed during that time period. 
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This misstates the rule. Packer cites but only partially quotes Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). While Jenkins’  three-step rule no longer states the current 
test, its basic tenet holds true: “If the plaintiff does not have [traditional standing,] we 
will then address . . . whether [the plaintiff is an appropriate party]”56 for public interest 
standing. Id. 
Parties may have public interest standing to sue even if they have not suffered an 
injury justifying traditional standing. “Parties may gain standing if they can show that 
they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance.”  Gregory v. 
Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶15 299 P.3d 1098. 
First, a party is “appropriate” when it “demonstrat[es] that it has the interest 
necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and 
factual questions. . . .” Gregory, 2013 UT 18, ¶36. The plaintiffs in Gregory (legislators 
and public officials) sought public interest standing to challenge an education bill 
“establishing new programs, [] amending existing programs,” and funding some 
programs. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. They alleged that the bill violated Utah Const. Art. VI Sec. 22’s 
requirement that each bill address a single subject with a title clearly expressing its 
subject. Id. at ¶ 4.  
The Gregory plaintiffs were deemed “appropriate,” not because they were a 
longstanding group or suffered harm from governmental action, but because they had 
“admirabl[y]. . . brief[ed] the facts and controlling law.” Id. at ¶ 29. They “show[ed] 
                                                 
56 Jenkins, at 1150. 
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themselves able to effectively assist the court in its consideration of the Article VI 
claims” by “caus[ing] this court to consider those rules and clarify the standards they 
impose for the first time in decades . . . .” Id., at ¶ 29. Here, Plaintiffs are “appropriate” 
parties because they presented the district court with lines of controlling law on standing 
and due process unacknowledged by the City, with analysis and facts showing their taut 
application to the present case. 
An “appropriate” party must also show “the issues are unlikely to be raised if the 
party is denied standing.” This does not require that some hypothetical, more perfect 
plaintiff could not arise in the future. Id. at ¶ 30. For example, Gregory simply noted the 
Board of Education (a hypothetical plaintiff) had been silent on the issues and “no other 
plaintiff ha[d] emerged in the years since the Bill's passage. . . .” Id. at ¶30. This rendered 
future opportunities to raise the issues “unlikely,” making the Gregory plaintiffs 
“appropriate.” 
Plaintiffs’ situation here closely parallels Gregory. Questions about court filing 
costs, attorneys’ fees, and collection costs are as even less likely to recur than those 
presented in Gregory. Small claims court costs and City attorney’s fees listed on the 
Notice amount to $235; to get to district court, the total cost leaps to at least $485.57 
Those costs squelched virtually any desire to fight a $15-$55 citation.58 Further, now that 
                                                 
57 See fn. 51 . 
58 Moreover, a court facing a similar, but less egregious situation—one where a $50 
automated red light citation required a $67.50 fee to lodge an appeal—granted 
traditional standing, even though the plaintiff had neither paid the fine nor requested a 
hearing, and viewed the citation’s inaccuracy about that fee to be irrelevant to its 
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the City has “updated” the ordinances, the likelihood that someone cited for parking 
violations will mount the present challenge to contest these issues approaches zero. The 
district court’s rejection of  Plaintiffs as “appropriate” parties was therefore error. 
Second, “significant” public interest requires litigation of issues of “sufficient 
weight” that “are not more appropriately addressed by another branch of government 
pursuant to the political process.” Id., at ¶31. In Gregory, questions about Art. VI Sec. 22 
were sufficient because they addressed “restrictions on the legislative process itself.” Id. 
“Where the legislature has passed a bill and the governor has signed it, we cannot assume 
that either of those branches are appropriate parties to whom to entrust the prosecution of 
a claim that the bill violates the strictures of Article I, Section 22.” Id. Gregory’s plaintiffs 
sought “to enforce an explicit and mandatory constitutional provision dealing primarily 
with questions of form and process,” and “the restrictions on the legislative process 
imposed by. . . Section 22 give every citizen of Utah an interest in seeing them obeyed. . . 
.” Id. at ¶¶32, 35. This satisfied the test and conferred public interest standing. Id. at ¶ 32.  
                                                                                                                                                             
analysis. Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, 582 F.3d 617, 620-21 (6th Cir., 2009) 
(holding that Williams had traditional standing to allege due process violations from a 
red-light camera ticket.) “[A] notice that offers the ticketed the choice between paying 
a $50 fine and having to pay $67.50 to challenge it offers no choice at all. That the 
citation was inaccurate must be irrelevant: plaintiffs cannot be required to be 
clairvoyant and may, justifiably, rely on what their notice in fact says. . . . The fact 
that she did not pay at all does not change what the ticket offered her; it remained an 
irrevocably bad bargain. Imagine, for example, if the ticket was for $50 but the fee 
was $100,000—we would not say there that it was improper not to pay the fee to 
challenge the procedures. That Williams received an improper processing fee over and 
above the price of the ticket itself gives her standing enough to get in the courthouse 
door.” 
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Here, the issues have sufficient weight and are not political questions. They strike 
at the heart of due process, defining the relationship of all three branches of municipal 
governments to every Utah citizen. The issues address form and process, as did the Art.VI 
Sec. 22 issues in Gregory. The City’s executive and legislature together removed the 
parking meters, understood the ordinances were insufficient, did not change the law for 
over two years, and ignored the City Code process for contesting tickets in favor of an 
unauthorized system designed to suppress the exercise of legal rights. There is no realistic 
chance that those branches will ever litigate or resolve the issues here, leaving the 
Plaintiffs as “appropriate” parties to address them. 
Finally, the district court explained that “public interest standing is only 
appropriate where ‘the challenged actions directly impact the public.’” R. 511, citing BV 
Lending LLC v. Jordanelle Special Service District, 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 16, 294 P.3d 656. 
The district court concluded “The Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of certain 
pay for service provisions within Salt Lake's municipal code do not directly impact the 
public.” R. 511.  
This misstates the scope of Plaintiffs’ contentions—that the City violated due 
process as a matter of law and collected fines without authority of law—as well as the 
consequences of the City’s actions and justifications—that the City may jettison its 
ordinances and rules and state statutes as it pleases, because the fines are “only” $15-$55. 
The ultimate decision about whether the City can or cannot continue to do what it has 
done applies universally to the operation of Utah local governments. The issues affect the 
relationship between every Utahn and their respective local governments, addressing 
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whether or not the City (and all cities) are bound by the rule of law, which every Utah 
citizen has an interest in seeing enforced. It is hard to conceive of a more important, or 
more public, interest. 
As Plaintiffs are “appropriate” parties raising issues of “significant public 
importance,” they should be granted public interest standing to seek refund of court filing 
costs, attorney fees, and collection costs taken by the City from members of the proposed 
class. The district court erred in deciding otherwise.  
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs properly stated claims for unjust enrichment and denial of due process. 
The City’s affirmative defenses of waiver and voluntary payment are inappropriate 
grounds for a motion to dismiss, and they fail as a matter of law where the City allegedly 
took Plaintiffs’ money through material misinformation about the process, fraud and 
duress. Plaintiffs stated a claim for unjust enrichment where the City lacked authority of 
law under its parking meter ordinance to collect parking fees and fines, the City admitted 
as much and subsequently overhauled the ordinance, and the City’s processes for 
challenging citations fail to meet the Utah Municipal Code’s basic standards of due 
process.  
The City’s whimsical Notice and invented process for challenging parking tickets 
violated every notion of due process articulated by Utah courts, and indeed violated the 
City’s own code. Finally, the Court should grant Plaintiffs public interest standing to seek 
certain costs borne by unnamed prospective class members, because Plaintiffs are best 
suited to prosecute those claims, the issues impact the general public, and the legal claims 
are identical regardless of the types of damages sustained. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district 
court's dismissal as to all causes of action and remand the case. Appellants also 
respectfully request that the Court decide all questions of law raised here that will be 
necessary to final determination of the case pursuant to U .R.A.P. 30. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 20 15. ~~ 
R. Shane Johnson 
Mark S. Schw~ 
Bruce R. Baird 
---
Attorney for Appellants I Plaintiffs 
63 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(l) 
I, R. Shane Johnson, on this 1 oTH day of December, 2015' certify that this brief is 
submitted in compliance with rule 24(f)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
Brief of Appellants contains 13,904 words pursuant to the word count of the word 
processing system used to prepare the brief. Also, the Brief of Appellant complies with 
the typeface requirements of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 72(b) because it has been 
prepared using Microsoft Word, Times New Roman, size 13 font. 
--
R. Shane Johnson ) 
Attorney for Appelladts I Plaintiff 
64 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this 10th day of December, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF was served by e-mail and U.S. Mail, and 
addressed to the following: 
J. ELIZABETH HAWS (l 1667) 
451 South State Street, Room 505A 
P.O. Box 145478 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 14-5478 
Telephone: (801) 535-7788 
janet.haws@slcgov.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
65 
